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1 
Introduction 
Corruption is not a purely modern problem. Britain’s history is littered with scandals and attempts to 
introduce reforms intended to eradicate what, by the nineteenth century, was called ‘Old Corruption’. 
This report investigates what the past tells us and hence why our history matters. It is striking how few of 
our earlier struggles with corruption are known about, let alone reflected on as potentially useful data. 
Thinking about the past can help us to think about the present, not so much because it offers a blue-print 
for anti-corruption strategies but because it challenges our assumptions, offers alternative visions, and 
forces us to re-assess concepts and solutions. 
What follows draws on research into corruption in Britain and its colonies between the reformation of 
the sixteenth century (which “reformed” religious institutions and also the secular authorities that 
supported the new religion) and the reform processes of the nineteenth century (which sought to 
modernise the parliamentary system but also local and national government as well as the church).1 
During this three-hundred year period Britain was emerging as a complex ‘modernising’ nation, shifting 
from a personal monarchy to a parliamentary state and experiencing revolutionary innovations in 
commerce, finance, press freedom, religious freedoms, global outlook, professionalization, and the 
capacity to fight large scale war. This, then, was a stage in the evolution of the British state that offers 
uncanny parallels with many other countries today as they struggle with far-reaching political, religious, 
economic, cultural and social change. But the parallels need care: each nation has a different history that 
has shaped its understanding of corruption and its evolution of anti-corruption movements and practices. 
The British story should not be seen as having a timeless and universal applicability. But it might 
nevertheless have wider resonances, not least because of Britain’s global, imperial influence on other 
national stories in the pre-modern world; because Britain is today regarded, according to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, as relatively un-corrupt; and looked to for leadership in 
tackling corruption.  
What, then, might we glean from looking at our own history of corruption?  
The first section of this report suggests that our modern notion of corruption (centred on bribery and 
probity in office-holding) has evolved in a particular way that is closely related to our past and that in the 
process alternative ways of thinking about corruption have been largely displaced. The aim of this section 
is to make us pause before assuming that the North Western European tradition is necessarily the only 
way of construing proper behaviour, not least because even within its evolution there have been some 
quite radical and fiercely contested shifts in what corruption meant. We need to keep an open mind about 
what constitutes corruption if we are to be sensitive to its evolutions. The past reminds us that corruption 
always has an eye on the future and wants to shape it. 
The second section examines how ideas about probity in public office evolved over time, arguing that this 
key element of our modern notion of corruption was the result of a protracted process that involved 
social and cultural change as well as, crucially, strengthening notions of power as entrusted by, and 
accountable to, the people. “Trust” is thus not only the social bond that erodes corruption but also a 
powerful legal and popular notion that sets out the conditions on which popular sovereignty is given to 
those who exercise power. There was an active debate in the past about the duties and responsibilities of 
“office-holders” – those who either held public office directly from the state or non-state office which 
nevertheless affected the public.  
                                               
1 Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
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The third section looks more broadly at what factors facilitate anti-corruption. This highlights the 
transformations possible if non-partisan commissions systematically examine the administration of 
governmental departments and public finance; the additional weight when popular and elite pressures 
coincide; and how campaigns for strong ethics underpin a reform agenda by ensuring that its rationale is 
embraced rather than being seen as a mere set of abstract rules. It is also argued that the state is both part 
of the problem and the solution, because although its growth facilitates corruption it also offers the best 
means to curb it. Two caveats are made. The first is that corruption is a highly resistant problem and that 
hence reform can take a long time – there is no easy, quick solution. The second is that those mobilising 
the rallying cry of “corruption” often do so for self-serving or even corrupt ends, so that we have to be 
careful how we view those pressing for change as well as those resisting it.  
At the end of this report is a very short, historical case study about the seventeenth-century diarist Samuel 
Pepys that is designed to encourage debate about what constitutes corruption and hence also show that 
history can be a useful way of exploring modern dilemmas about how we should behave.  
3 
1. The evolution of ideas about 
corruption 
Corruption is a capacious, changing and contested term 
Corruption was, and is, a capacious term with many dimensions. Awareness that there has never been a 
single, fixed, universal definition of corruption helps us appreciate that our modern notion of corruption 
is the product of a certain historical process. Today we tend to think of corruption as bribery or the abuse 
of public office for private gain. Yet bribery was a common law crime that, outside of bribes offered at 
elections, was not commonly prosecuted until the nineteenth century. Before then, the state was far more 
concerned with extortion and the abuse of power, and with embezzlement of public funds. The general 
public was agitated by excessive taxation caused by tribes of self-serving state officials, a corrupt electoral 
system, the corrupt influence of the Crown on Parliament (the monarchy was thought for much of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to be able to pervert the independence of MPs through the rewards 
of offices, patronage and payments) as well as non-financial types of corruption, such as the corrupting 
ideas flowing from revolutionary France, or the corruption of morals. The single word “corruption”, 
then, contained a multitude of meanings. These are often best separated out and treated as discrete but 
linked problems; and corruption has to be seen as more than bribery. Corruption was thus a more wide-
ranging concept than today and different notions of it jostled for dominance. 
The most common usage of the word “corruption” in the pre-modern world was as a way of describing 
man’s original state of sin or his sinful behaviour. Hence it was closely linked with a sense of immorality- 
corruption is a crime with a peculiarly strong moral resonance. Many of the metaphors that we still use to 
talk about fiscal and political corruption are rooted in this earlier religious meaning. Thus the first 
mention of the “canker of corruption” occurs in a 1590 religious tract; “clean hands” derives from a 
Biblical psalm; and the idea of a polluted stream or fountain of corruption is similarly a Scriptural 
metaphor. Protestant hostility to popery was one way in which a fiscal notion of corruption became 
popularised: the Catholic Church was seen not only as theologically corrupt but Rome was also regarded 
as a corrupt institution, extorting money from its followers. “Nepotism” was also closely associated with 
Popes who favoured their kinsmen to privileged places: the word entered the English language in 1669 
when Il Nipotismo di Roma was published – Samuel Pepys and his wife enjoyed reading it before supper 
one evening. Lord Acton’s nineteenth-century dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was also 
made in response to a history of the papacy.  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, whilst this religious sense of the term persisted, other types of 
corruption – administrative, imperial and parliamentary in particular – rose up the agenda, largely because 
the state and its resources expanded, thereby creating new challenges of control and oversight. In other 
words, the targets of anti-corruption shifted somewhat – and they continue to do so today. No sooner 
has one of the corruption hydra’s heads been cut off, than a new one grows in its place. Corruption 
changes shape and anti-corruption is a process, not a set of magical levers that need only be pulled once.  
Besides religious and moral issues, shifting ideas of corruption are also apparent in other spheres. 
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Politics 
In the early sixteenth century Nicholas Machiavelli suggested that states rose and fell, with periods of 
corruption and others in which virtue and liberty prevailed. For him, political corruption was about the 
erosion of political or civic virtues rather than abuse of office or extortion of money. Machiavelli 
therefore worried about the decay of whole political systems. The republican tradition in Britain often 
looked back to Machiavelli and worried about this systemic decay, attempting to devise political 
frameworks to ensure that political virtue could be maintained. Indeed, this was a powerful current in 
anti-corruption ideology throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Others, particularly in the 
radical tradition, used corruption to describe oppressive forms of power. Thus the Levellers in the mid 
seventeenth century attacked both the monarchy and Parliament as corrupt oppressors of the ordinary 
people; and early nineteenth century radicals similarly argued that the political system was corrupt and 
oppressive, capable of extracting large amounts of money from John Bull, only to redistribute it among 
the rich. Marxism similarly saw systemic corruption when the state in the service of capitalism had 
degenerated into a force of self-interest. Today this broader understanding of corruption is often side-
lined but it is one with an enduring appeal to popular protest movements which we see around the world. 
  
Image 1: The Whig politician Charles James Fox is shown cutting off corruption, one of the heads of the hydra 
that threatened the people. In mythology the hydra’s heads re-grew. © Trustees of the British Museum 
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Money 
Corruption has always been equated with unfair and oppressive acquisition of wealth, but what 
constituted unfair riches and legitimate profit changed over time. What we think of as corrupt today in 
the financial sphere has been shaped by history? This can be illustrated by looking at usury, self-interest, 
luxury, monopolies and the stock market. 
Usury 
Making money from interest on loans, is a good example of how ideas about corruption changed over 
time. A law of 1487 banned usury. Until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, usury was condemned 
as immoral and unneighbourly, associated with the sins of covetousness and avarice. Yet this view 
underwent a profound change. Over the course of the sixteenth century a limit to the amount of interest 
that could be charged was set; and in 1624 this became an effectual state-controlled interest rate of 8 per 
cent, gradually reduced over time, to just 5 per cent in 1713. Interest was by then increasingly justified as 
an intrinsic part of the new financial system. What had been seen as sinful became legitimised. 
 
Image 2: This image, by George Cruickshank, illustrated The Political House that Jack Built (1819), one of the most 
successful of the radical publications of William Hone, a persistent critic of corruption. © Trustees of the 
British Museum 
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Self-interest 
For most in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, self-interest was condemned. Indeed, “self-interest” 
and “selfish” were coined in the 1640s and 1650s as pejorative terms; “self-promoting” came in 1662 and 
“self-advancement” in 1707. Many writers, from both a secular and religious perspective, feared self-
interest as a highly corrosive force. Yet this too began to change. In the early eighteenth century Bernard 
de Mandeville wrote a series of provocative pieces in which he argued that private vice, including self-
interest, was a public benefit because it stimulated the economy.2 At least since Adam Smith, writing The 
Wealth of Nations in 1776, we have tended to see self-interest in a much more positive light and even as a 
means of deterring corruption. Susan Rose-Ackerman thus concluded in her highly influential 1999 
analysis of corruption that “there is one human motivator that is both universal and central to explaining 
the divergent experiences of different countries. That motivator is self-interest, including an interest in the 
well-being of one’s family and peer group. Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility maximisation. 
Whatever the label societies differ in the way they channel self-interest. Endemic corruption suggests a 
pervasive failure to tap self-interest for productive purposes.”3 Self-interest has thus gone from being 
seen as something intrinsically corrupting to something that can eradicate corruption – though such 
conclusions were also contested in the past and remain controversial today. 
Luxury 
Intrinsic to Smith’s ideas were also changing (though again deeply contested) views about luxury. In the 
eyes of the protestant churches and the Machiavellian republican tradition, luxury was thought to be 
corrupting of a nation’s morality and virtue as well as its readiness to fight war. Luxury was thus politically 
and commercially corrosive. One moralist in 1736 lamented that “The prodigious Spirit of Pride, Luxury, 
Profuseness, Vanity and Corruption, that hath shewn itself in this Kingdom for some Years past, (and 
which if not speedily remedied, will inevitably put an end to the Name, Trade, and Constitution of the 
British Nation) begins now to be felt by every honest and thinking Subject: Nothing but Extravagance, 
Voluptuousness and Idleness, with all their direful Consequences, being seen in every Corner of the 
Kingdom.”4 As late as 1800 a cleric, Adam Sibbit, argued that “Luxury has been the bane of every 
nation”, leading to its ‘debility and corruption’.5 Yet such views were questioned. Mandeville had argued 
that private vices, including luxury, were “public benefits” and others agreed that luxuries promoted trade 
and were economically useful as well as civilising. Luxury as a positive force was not universally accepted 
at any point in the pre-modern period but it certainly became more acceptable and even embraced as a 
public good. 
  
                                               
2 These are accessible at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mandeville-the-fable-of-the-bees-or-private-vices-publick-benefits-vol-1  
3 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge, 1999) p.2 
4 Erasmus Jones, Luxury,Pride and Vanity (1736) p.1 
5 Adam Sibbit, A Dissertation, Moral and Political, on the Influence of Luxury and Refinement on Nations (1800) p.9 
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Monopolies 
Similarly monopolies were initially seen by the emerging state as a way of generating important revenue 
and promoting trade but were increasingly condemned as corrupting. Granting a monopoly, it was 
suggested, conferred a protected status that could nurture commerce, and in the international sphere was 
seen as vital as a way of advancing the national interest over continental, imperial rivals. Thus throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the state – initially the Crown but increasingly Parliament – 
granted monopolies. To be sure, criticism of monopolies was rife throughout this period; but the idea 
that a monopoly was the best way to advance trade took a long time to change. The East India 
Company’s monopoly was not removed until 1833. It is only relatively recently that free trade has been 
considered a better commercial system, so that the protectionism inherent in Britain’s rise to great power 
status seems a corrupt mingling of state and the market. Until then, it was abuses in the way in which 
monopolies were obtained or administered that generated the real heat of anti-corruption, not the system 
itself. 
Stock market 
Almost since its inception in the later seventeenth century the modern financial system (a state bank, 
national debt funded by taxation, and stock market) was regarded as corrupt and corrupting. At this time 
the stock-jobber – an agent who dealt in shares and talked their value up or down – was the object of a 
huge amount of public scorn, particularly in the aftermath of the first stock market crash, the South Sea 
Bubble in 1720, when some investors made enormous losses. Jonathan Swift and others attacked the 
“monied interest” as corrupt, self-interested and a threat to the true interest of the nation. One of the 
leaders of the early Tory party, Lord Bolingbroke, had no doubt that “the opportunity of amassing 
immense estates by the management of funds, by trafficking in paper, and by all the arts of jobbery, was a 
reason of private interest to those who supported and improved the scheme of iniquity, if not of those 
who devised it”.6 Few in the pre-modern era trusted the money markets and financial system to work for 
the public good; many saw them as the epitome of corruption, generating wealth for only a self-serving 
few who had their noses in the trough, especially when integrated with a corrupt parliamentary system. 
Yet the stock market, too, became a permanent feature of the financial system, legitimised as a way of 
making money both for private individuals and the state. 
These shifts in attitudes, and different conceptions of political and economic corruption, in the past 
remind us that our current notions of what constitutes corruption are not timeless, inevitable and 
universal abstractions but part of a historical process. Notions about what is unfair, unjust or immoral 
change over time, in part in response to anti-corruption campaigns that help to define what is found to be 
offensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use of History (1752) p. 39 
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Image 3: A detail of an early seventeenth century satire of Sir Giles Mompesson, the epitome of a greedy 
“monopolist”. As the text explains, an anagram of his name “Mo-Empsons” recalls Henry VII’s minister Sir 
Richard Empson who was executed in 1510 for treason, though corruption explained much of the hostility 
against him. © Trustees of the British Museum 
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2. The Evolution of Modern Notions 
of Office-holding 
Corruption is often defined as the abuse of public office or public power for private gain.7 Understanding 
what constituted “abuse of public office” is aided by an appreciation of the history of office-holding, 
which highlights another series of fundamental shifts. From being responsible to the monarch, office-
holders became responsible to the people. Instead of private pieces of property, offices came to be 
thought of as the property of the state. And instead of positions that were filled out of a sense of the 
obligations of social status, a less personal form of authority came to be idealised. What follows sets out 
these shifts in order to show that our norms in these regards were worked out over a long period of time. 
Public office was often seen as a quasi-personal position with informal 
remuneration and we need to understand both what motivated people to 
act “corruptly” and how they could justify, to themselves and publicly, 
what they did. 
Although officials in state departments were appointed by the monarch on salaries, many more office-
holders received little or nothing from the state – even payment to MPs was phased out in the 
seventeenth century because it was thought to be a burden on taxpayers and restrict the independence of 
MPs (salaries were not re-introduced until 1911). Nor was there any general pension system for those 
serving the state until the nineteenth century. Appointment to some key posts, such as local magistrates, 
was a reflection of social status rather than ability and was seen as a social responsibility. Many officers 
acted out of a sense of duty rather than for reward, though many were also entitled, legally, to charge fees 
and enjoy certain perquisites (“perks”). There was also a semi-legal trade in the sale of offices – this was 
so open that it even featured in newspaper advertisements. 
The revenue generated from fees, perquisites and sales was often an intrinsic and legal part of the way the 
“system” operated. Similarly, the electoral system was often deeply influenced by social and financial 
factors as well as ideological ones: successful candidates, particularly from the second half of the 
eighteenth century onwards, spent vast fortunes in electioneering. Historians have thus pointed out that 
power in the 18th Century state was often very localised and personal. There was thus a “social history” of 
corruption. This meant that few people sought to, or were able to, act on the basis of impartial rules of 
office, needing instead to rely on the “custom and practice” that had become the way of doing things, 
which provided a legitimating defence against charges of corruption, and neutralised allegations of 
immorality. It also made for a rational self-justification. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 The World Bank, United Nations, OECD and EU use this definition. 
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In 1670, reviewing his own receipt of “gifts”, Samuel Pepys talked of “those gratifications which both 
practice and the quality of my place might justify an expectation and acceptance of…when employed in 
matters of lawful favour to private men”.8 Seen from the perspective of those occupying office, 
surrounded by customary expectations and obligations, it is not difficult to understand why they behaved 
as they did, even if we are now clear that such conduct would be wrong. But this underlines both that we 
need to understand how people see their own conduct and that anti-corruption initiatives will fail unless 
we understand the extent to which the “system” steers people to behave in certain ways, and the ways in 
which they have internalised different codes of behaviour as legitimate.  
The evolution of public office: office as a piece of personal 
property that could be sold 
Notions of, and regulations concerning, public office gradually shifted over time. One key aspect 
concerned the sale of office. Legislation against the sale of office was very weak: two statutes dating from 
1388 and 1552 governed offices administering justice and the royal revenue, but their very limited scope 
enabled quite widespread venality of posts together with large scope for informal and often unfixed fees. 
Yet a series of interesting legal cases clarified and limited what was permissible. 
In 1725 the highest law officer in the land, Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, was prosecuted in Parliament 
for selling offices in the court of Chancery. His defence rested largely on the idea that office was a private 
property: “every Man has a natural Right to dispose of his own Estate or Interest, his own Friendship or 
Favour upon what Consideration he pleases: it is his own and therefore has a Right to make any just and 
legal Advantage of it”.9 Thus, Macclesfield argued, “taking a Present, or taking Money from Persons upon 
their Recommendations or Nominations into Offices, though they do concern the Administration or 
Execution of Justice, is not a Crime in its own Nature; it is no Act of Immorality; it is no Act of Injustice 
to any Man”.10  
                                               
8 Guy De la Bédoyère (ed.), The Letters of Samuel Pepys, 1656-1703 (2006) pp.81-2, Samuel Pepys to the Brooke House 
Commissioners, 6 January 1670. 
9 Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials (1812) xvi. 1087 
10 Cobbett's State Trials xvi. 1088 
Image 4: Two advertisements from The Oracle and Public Advertiser 20 Jan. 1798 placed by those seeking or selling 
offices in the state and army 
11 
Indeed, his defence asserted, “The Publick is concerned only in the Goodness of the Officer, not how 
advantageous to him the Grant of the Office is, nor in the Inducement to which he that appointed him 
had to put him in: whether Friendship, Acquaintance, Relation, Importunity, great Recommendation or a 
Present”.11 Macclesfield was nevertheless found guilty of “high crimes and misdemeanours” because of 
the sales of office he had transacted and fined £40,000. 
This did not end the matter. In 1769 Samuel Vaughan was alleged to have tried buying an office in 
Jamaica from the Prime Minister of the day, the earl of Grafton. He too tried arguing that if a competent 
official was put into the place, then “the public have no business to enquire into it”.12 Vaughan too was 
condemned. But it took another scandal, surrounding the sale of offices by the duke of York, George 
III’s son, and his mistress Mary Clarke to achieve legislative change in 1809. Even after that, army 
commissions continued to be sold until 1871. Nevertheless, attitudes to the sale of civil offices had 
clearly, if slowly, changed.  
                                               
11 Cobbett's State Trials xvi. 1274 
12 Samuel Vaughan, An Appeal to the Public on behalf of Samuel Vaughan Esq (1770) p.55 
Image 5: Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, who was prosecuted for corruption in 1725. © Trustees of the British 
Museum 
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The Evolution of Misconduct in Public Office. 
A case in 1783 is taken to be the foundation of the modern law on misconduct in public office – a crime 
that the Law Commission has announced in 2016 it would like to see move from common law to statute.  
Charles Bembridge was an accountant in the army pay office accused of concealing £48,000 owed to the 
state by the Paymaster General Henry Fox, Lord Holland. In the eighteenth century, some senior officers 
were allowed to keep public money in their hands in order to make payments. Bembridge's defence was 
that he had not broken a law and could not have been expected “to turn a spy” on those who employed 
him; if he had done, “all mankind must have hooted and hissed him”.13 Bembridge's counsel argued that 
there were “other ways of punishing” such men than by such prosecutions.  
The prosecution put the case very differently. The Solicitor General, arguing for the Crown, said that 
Bembridge's defence was claiming that “it is the excuse of a man in a public office, that he connives at 
public crimes because his friend commits them”.14 He also insisted that if Bembridge was acquitted, “not 
only this man must go unpunished but all the people in all the offices, in this kingdom, of the same sort, 
may do the like with impunity”.15 He laid it down that “if this is a public office, it appears to me to be a 
principle that it has public duties belonging to it”.16 The Judge, Lord Mansfield, agreed: Bembridge 
…was a trustee of the public and the Paymaster, for making every charge and 
every allowance he knew of ...if the defendant knew of the omission...and if he 
concealed it, his motive must have been corrupt. That he did know was fully 
proved and he was guilty, therefore, not of an omission or neglect but of a gross 
deceit. The object could only have been to defraud the public ... a man accepting 
an office of trust, concerning the public, especially if attended with profit, is 
answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in his office; this is true by 
whomever and in whatever way the officer is appointed.17 
The evolution of office as a public trust 
Mansfield referred to “an office of trust concerning the public”. The notion of trust is extremely 
important. Transparency International’s definition of corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain and it is in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the notion of entrusted power 
emerged. Trust was initially a body of law relating to private property; but it came to be applicable to 
public office. How and why did this change occur? 
One reason was the ideological contest between Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century. In 
1642, in a last ditch (and unsuccessful) attempt to stave off civil war, Parliament presented King Charles I 
with a series of propositions; in refusing them, the King invoked the trust he had received from God. 
This prompted a lawyer and polemicist called Henry Parker to note that “The word Trust is frequent in 
the Kings Papers, and therefore I conceive the King does admit that his interest in the Crowne is not 
absolute, or by a meere donation of the people, but in part conditionate and fiduciary”.18 
                                               
13 Cobbett's State Trials xxii. 56 
14 Cobbett's State Trials xxii. pp. 68-9 
15 Cobbett's State Trials xxii. p.69 
16 Cobbett's State Trials xxii. pp.69-70 
17 Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the English Courts of Common Law (1835) xxvi. 128 
18 Henry Parker, Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses (1642), p.4 
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Parker argued that the people, through Parliament, entrusted the king with his power; that his power was 
therefore conditional; and that a breach of trust occurred when power was abused. The Puritan William 
Prynne, also declared that the king was “in nature of the Heire of a Feoffee in trust, for the use and 
service of the kingdome”.19 In other words, Parker and Prynne applied the legal notion of trust, which 
had largely been related to private property, to public office. These ideas were both rapidly taken up and 
extended. Public offices more generally became referred to as “places of trust”. Thus on 17 Feb. 1642 the 
House of Commons voted that “the Buying and Selling of Offices of Trust belonging to Courts of 
Justice, and the Commands of Forts, Castles, and Places of Trust, are Causes of the Evils of this 
Kingdom”. 
The idea of office as a trust was perhaps so readily embraced because of widespread knowledge of 
Cicero’s classical work De Officiis which argued that “the Government of a State is much like the Office of 
a Guardian or Trustee; which should always be manag'd for the good of the Pupil, and not of the Persons 
to whom he is entrusted”.20 
But it was not just the monarch’s actions in the seventeenth century that stimulated the development of 
the notion of office as trust, for the behaviour of MPs in Parliament alarmed pressure groups such as the 
Levellers, who feared that they had replaced a monarchical with a parliamentary tyranny. In tract after 
tract, John Lilburne and other Levellers thus referred to MPs as “entrusted” by the people. Lilburne and 
Richard Overton argued “that all Majesteriall Power in England whatever, are but Offices of trust, and 
bound up with this limitation, to be executed for the good of the trusters” and that just as the king had 
breached his trust “the same doe we aver of a Parliament, and Parliament-men … when they cease to 
execute the end of their trust, which is as themselves say, to provide for the peoples weales, but not for 
their woes, and doe meerly indeavour to make themselves tyrants over the people”.21 The Levellers were 
defeated; but this idea had a long afterlife. MPs were frequently referred to thereafter as ‘trustees’ for the 
people. 
The notion that monarch and representatives were merely given entrusted power by the sovereign people 
became the bedrock not only of political theory – codified in the ideas of John Locke and Algernon 
Sidney – but also routine in the on-going struggles throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
against encroaching monarchical power and a corrupt Parliament. An influential periodical, Cato’s Letters, 
published in the wake of the 1720 South Sea Bubble, and amid anxiety about political and economic 
corruption, argued that all government “is therefore a trust, which ought to be bounded with many and 
strong restraints, because power renders men wanton, insolent to others, and fond of themselves. Every 
violation therefore of this trust, where such violation is considerable, ought to meet with proportionable 
punishment”.22 Corruption as a breach of trust figured in numerous trials, including most impeachments 
– the phrase was used nine times in the charges brought against the governor of the East India Company, 
Warren Hastings, when he was accused of corruption in 1786. Moreover, the idea of entrusted power also 
migrated to the American colonies. The 1662 Connecticut charter was granted “in Trust” for the benefit 
of settlers there, and other colonial charters followed suit. Breach of trust also figured in the rhetoric used 
by the colonists when asserting their independence. In 1765 John Adams said that “rulers are no more 
than attorneys, agents, and trustees, for the people”23 and the Virginia Convention demanded a bill of 
rights declaring that that “That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from, the 
people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them”.24   
                                               
19 William Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643), ‘The Parliaments Interest in the Militia’, p.12 
20 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tully's Three Books of Offices, in English (1699) p.83 
21 John Lilburne and Richard Overton, The Out-cryes of Oppressed Commons (1646) pp.17-18 
22 Cato’s Letters 38, 22 July 1721 
23 William Cranch, Memoir of the Life, Character, and Writings of John Adams (Washington, 1827) p.18 
24 Virginia Declaration of Rights, 12 June 1776 
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Trust had become a concept that spread throughout the English-speaking world. It carried principles that 
underpin anti-corruption measures: that trustees work for the good of the entrustors not themselves; that 
they should not profit from being trustees; that the trustee has a duty of care; and that trustees have 
discretion but can be held to account when that discretion is abused. The establishment of that notion 
was the result of national trauma but also a thickening of the law, as well as the work of political theorists 
and popular campaigners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
Image 6: A tract of 1660 attacking the sale of offices which it calls “Places of Trust”. 
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The Evolution of Accountability 
Notions and practices of accountability grew alongside the development of trust. Accountability has 
different facets: it means the ability to scrutinise financial accounts but also holding someone to account. 
An auditor was someone who examined ledgers but also literally “heard” the person wishing to have his 
accounts validated. Accountability was thus both numerical and verbal. 
Fiscal accountability developed slowly and unevenly across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Although the medieval system of royal courts provided a basic check on income and expenditure, the 
enormous expansion of the state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries placed great strain on it. 
Once again the seventeenth-century civil war plays a significant role as a trigger, since the practice of 
parliamentary scrutiny of accounts was a product of Parliament raising its own money to equip its own 
army. The 1640s and 1650s saw new ways in which the state raised finance and new ways of accounting 
for its expenditure. But the development of public accounting was not linear. After the restoration of the 
monarchy in 1660, parliamentary scrutiny of public accounts became less intrusive. 
Only after the second revolution of the seventeenth century, in 1688-9, did a parliamentary committee 
acquire the teeth to investigate corruption but this body became abused as a political weapon and in 1714 
it was allowed to lapse. It was only revived in the early 1780s when the cost of the war with America put 
retrenchment and reform back on the agenda. The 1785 commissions of accounts – significantly not 
parliamentary – was instituted not only to investigate but also to suggest reforms. The appointment of a 
non-partisan commission with a reformist remit proved instrumental in introducing a series of measures – 
over several generations – that reduced the number of redundant offices, replaced fees with salaries, and 
introduced and systematised new administrative procedures. 
Accountability in the form of a free press had a similar chronology and degree of uncertainty. Until 1641 
the government relied on pre-publication censorship of the press to restrict public discussion. Whilst 
manuscript libels did circulate freely and indict corruption, the proliferation of printed attacks after 1641, 
when the government lost control of the press on the eve of the civil war, moved public accountability to 
a new level. Access to cheap print meant greater scrutiny of public officials and exposure of their 
misbehaviour. Censorship was re-imposed in the 1650s and again under the restored monarchy after 1660 
but was removed briefly in 1679 and then permanently after 1695. Thereafter, and particularly in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the quantity of print expanded dramatically and the newspaper, a 
seventeenth innovation, flourished. 
Authors, publishers and printers made use of the freedom of the press to bang the drum of anti-
corruption: this was a central feature of The Craftsman, published in the 1720s and 30s to critique the 
administration of Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole; the journalism of an anonymous anti-corruption 
campaigner who signed himself “Junius” in the late 1760s and early 1770s; and then of the Radical 
periodicals by William Cobbett, William Hone, Richard Carlile and Thomas Wooler in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. Freedom of the press became a cherished principle for these anti-
corruption voices, not least because of government attempts to silence them. William Hone, for example, 
was tried three times in three days in 1817 for his satires on the corruption of the ministry after the 
Napoleonic Wars and championed the press as “the thing” that could “poison the Vermin” who 
plundered the wealth of the nation.25 Governmental repression of the press was far from over, but it had 
become increasingly axiomatic that freedom to print not only went hand in hand with anti-corruption but 
was also increasingly seen as part of the rights of free-born Britons.  
                                               
25 William Hone, The Political House that Jack Built (1819) 
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Image 7: Another image from William Hone’s 1819 pamphlet, showing the power of the press to “poison the 
Vermin” who plundered the wealth of the country. © Trustees of the British Museum 
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3. What factors facilitated anti-
corruption efforts? 
The previous section showed that administrative reform came about from the 1780s onwards because of 
the appointment of a non-partisan commission that systematically reviewed the practice of all the major 
government departments and how public finance was handled. The foregoing account also stressed that a 
mixture of corruption scandals, awareness within the political elite about the need for change, intellectual 
victories over trust and wider agitation against corruption led, somewhat haphazardly (the state showed 
very little capacity for a collective memory or even to sustain its measures) and over a long period of time, 
to a series of legal cases and administrative reforms that cumulatively reshaped the relationship between 
state and office-holder. Yet this thickening of practice and law was not in itself sufficient. 
What other factors promoted change? 
The efforts of individuals who championed anti-corruption were important in keeping anti-corruption on 
the agenda but in themselves their achievement was often very limited. Although some of their ideas may 
eventually have been taken on board, individual promoters seldom achieved what they wanted and were 
often victimised by governments or administrators who resisted change. In the first decade of the 
nineteenth century James Gilchrist, for example, proposed many reforms of the navy that were eventually 
taken up; but he was given little protection against the vested interests that he was fighting and was 
himself accused of corruption in order to silence him. Plenty of other examples underline the unhappy 
life of whistle-blowers.  
Popular pressure was more successful. The previous section highlighted the growth of the press as an 
agent of accountability; and print was part of the pressure “the public” (itself a new term from the 
seventeenth century onwards) was able to exert. Other mechanisms mobilising and articulating popular 
pressure included petitions which were sent in their thousands to Parliament and monarch to expose 
grievances and request that they be redressed. Mass petitions were a feature of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and particularly the nineteenth centuries. The mobilisation of opinion through clubs, societies 
and associations – the growth of what we might call “civil society” – was another way to exert pressure. 
So too was more unruly forms of protest: crowd anger, riots and even disturbances. The Great Reform 
Act of 1832, which addressed the corruption of the parliamentary system by abolishing “rotten 
boroughs” that enabled the wealthy to buy their seats at Westminster, was thus achieved in part because 
of the fear of unrest.  
Corruption is a term that has always resonated with the public as a way of condemning systems 
(conveying a notion of decay from an earlier or ideal better state), or people (condemning certain types of 
behaviour: self-interested, undermining the common good, oppressive, excessively greedy, taking unfair 
advantage). What constituted a better state, or the public good, or oppression, or greed, or injustice could 
be endlessly disputed and redefined (and in a sense the debates about what constituted corruption were 
part of the point about anti-corruption movements); but the debates mattered. Moreover, failure to take 
measures against corruption led to scandals and popular unrest but also to major convulsions: the 
sixteenth century protestant reformation, the seventeenth century puritan revolution, the eighteenth 
century conflict with the American colonies, the nineteenth mass agitation around parliamentary reform 
were movements with multiple causes but all had anti-corruption figuring largely in them. Anti-corruption 
has the potential to mobilise large forces. 
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Public pressure was most effective when the public itself had a clear set of ethical values that it sought to 
impose on the “system”. There was something of a tension between those who thought that “measures” 
(structures and mechanisms to restrain corruption) were more important than “men” (the character traits 
of honesty and integrity). Some, such as James Harrington in the seventeenth century, sought to construct 
a political architecture that ensured virtue. And over time regulation after regulation was introduced. But 
adherence to rules alone was insufficient to ensure compliance and many were convinced that personal 
moral integrity was important. Campaigns against corruption thus often coincided with “moral reform” 
movements or attempts to promote a sense of duty beyond private interest. Even if not explicitly 
religious, these advocated an internalisation of public duty and private integrity. 
A good example might be Lord Macartney, sent to India in the early 1780s in the wake of the Hastings 
affair, who self-consciously promoted a notion of strict integrity (which in his case was supplemented or 
drew inspiration from his religious beliefs). He denied his own integrity arose from any “heroic Virtue” 
but said that he had “a stronger passion than the love of money; and if I contribute to reinstate this 
Country in its former glory, I shall feel infinitely more pride and satisfaction than all” the fortune of a 
corrupt “nabob” who brought back vast wealth.26 As this suggests, anti-corruption was often 
accompanied by a professed patriotism and this became part of British national identity. 
During Hastings’s trial, his prosecutor Edmund Burke said that “if any one thing distinguishes this nation 
eminently above another, it is the dignity attached to its offices, from this, that there is less taint of 
corruption in them; so that he who would, in any part of these dominions, set up a system of corruption, 
and attempts to justify it on the score of utility, that man is staining, not only the general nature and 
character of office, but he is staining the peculiar and distinguishing glory of this country”.27 To be sure 
there were many who saw such claims to patriotism as a veneer for self-interest; but anti-corruption was 
accompanied by religious, humanist, republican or patriotic internalisations of a world beyond the self. 
These sentiments drove anti-corruption initiatives but were also seen as ways of ensuring compliance. 
There had to be something internalised beyond the mere rules. At the very minimum this required a 
reflective and pervasive public discussion about what constituted corrupt behaviour; at its more rigorous, 
it also involved allegiance to something bigger than individual self-interest. 
Reform was also initiated by a series of paradoxical factors. War both stimulated corruption and anti-
corruption: it expanded the opportunities for corruption, since it created a state with expanding resources 
of money and offices, but it also promoted ideas of retrenchment, accountability and reform. The state 
grew because of war: this both created parasites who fed off the growth and posed challenges about how 
the growth was managed and how oppressively greedy behaviour at the expense of the public could be 
curbed. War also often led to socio-economic dislocations which unleashed popular radicalism and 
protest against those who were thought to be unfairly profiting from others’ misery. These were times 
when the “cost of corruption” was most apparent.  
Another paradox was that reform needed Parliament to enact legislation but Parliament itself needed 
reform. Parliament, for much of the pre-modern period, was seen as corruptly elected, full of self-
interested MPs unduly influenced by interests other than those of their constituents. Extra-parliamentary 
pressures or initiatives were therefore vital. These included early forms of civil society, such as the 
Yorkshire Association in the 1780s, which pressurised for reform, and radical societies, such as the 
Corresponding Societies of the 1790s, which sought more root and branch reform. Change was achieved 
quickest when both popular and elite pressures coincided.  
                                               
26 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Lord Macartney’s Correspondence, p.5 Macartney to John Sulivan, 28 Jan. 1782 
27 The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1815-16, 4 vols), iv. 375 (18 Feb. 1788) 
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It is also worth noting here that political parties were not in themselves solutions to corruption: 
factionalism or excessive partisan conflict as well as oligarchy could increase rather than decrease 
corruption (as for example in the early eighteenth century). Partisanship could lead to behaviour that 
sought to capture state resources for one group. The party system within Parliament did not on its own 
serve to eradicate corruption; reform of Parliament came only after a series of other administrative and 
institutional reforms rather than providing their trigger.  
Shrinking the state?  
Some have suggested that a solution to corruption is a smaller state. Certainly grievances about taxation 
often led to calls for retrenchment wrapped in the language of corruption: landowners resented high tax 
on land, which they saw as benefiting City financiers, and the poor resented high taxes which seemed to 
subsidise the idle luxuries of the rich who monopolised state resources. Yet reduction in taxation did not 
necessarily mean a reduction in corruption (as Walpole’s administration in the 1720s and 1730s shows) 
and paradoxically, the growth of the state was one of the ways in which greater regulation occurred and 
corruption reduced. There was thus a healthy tension between demands for efficiency and retrenchment, 
on the one hand, and provision of practices and institutions that regulated or even removed corrupt 
practices. The state had its own self-interests but the expansion of the state also created the framework 
that restricted corruption. A paradox of corruption is thus that the expansion of the state both increases 
the opportunities for corruption and ultimately creates a set of institutions, mentalities and practices that 
can be brought to bear on corruption. The state then, has an interest in subordinating its officers to its 
control; but as a long line of critics have also pointed out, it has an interest in resisting its own power 
being subjected to control or made accountable to others, whether they claim a higher legal or popular 
authority. 
Image 8: This satire of 1831, shortly before the Reform Act, shows the electoral system as producing a stream 
of public money on which greedy politicians and “tax eaters”. © Trustees of the British Museum 
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Corruption is sometimes seen as a stage in economic development that reduces when wealth increases; 
but it could equally be said to be reduced when the institutions of the state are thickened and 
strengthened thereby making the rule of law impossible to evade and creating expectations of higher 
standards in public life. Although modern definitions of corruption seem to place the blame for 
corruption primarily on public officials and the state, in the name of freeing individuals and markets from 
state authority, corruption (or at least the administrative form of it) was increasingly restrained as the state 
and its bureaucratic processes were strengthened. There is no simple story here. Strong states enable the 
implementation of legal systems and standards of impartiality, and they allow the formalisation of markets 
and systems of exchange. But strong states also attract powerful pressures to act in the interests of 
particular groups – a state without power is not worth influencing, whereas one with it certainly is. That is 
why the state is both part of the solution as well as part of the problem.  
Two Caveats 
In considering the factors fostering anti-corruption we should also pause to acknowledge two important 
features of reform movements. 
1. Reform takes a long time! 
It is salutary, in an age looking for quick fixes to corruption, to recognise that Britain witnessed anxieties 
about, and fought against, corruption for at least three hundred years. The focus here is on 1550-1850 but 
the story might have been expanded before and after these dates. We should not now be looking for very 
rapid success with simplistic anti-corruption programmes when this has not happened in the past.  
Some political scientists argue that corruption is something that can be cured with a “big bang” of 
reforms lasting only a relatively short time.28 There is certainly a lot to be said in favour of a concerted 
effort to implement reform. Sweden is given as an example of this, having, it is said, achieved 
administrative reform over a period of about 20 years in the second half of the nineteenth century (1855-
75). Yet this is already far longer than most anti-corruption programmes run for; and the Swedish case 
seems to have rested on a groundswell of prosecutions for the previous fifty years. 
The British case similarly demonstrates that although there were a series of reforms over a sixty year 
period 1780-1840 these drew on a long history of anti-corruption campaigns. Moreover, even in 1840 
Britain was not entirely un-corrupt - the title of an 1853 pamphlet Is Bribery without a Remedy? is enough to 
indicate this – and a focus on the success of administrative reforms masks other types, such as colonial 
and electoral corruption as well as crony patronage, that persisted. In any case, both the Swedish and 
British reform campaigns were triggered by traumatic losses in war (the 1809 cession of Finland to Russia 
in the Swedish case; the 1781 loss of the American colonies in the British case) so these are problematic 
policy remedies. In short, the “Big Bang” notion may raise unrealistic expectations of a quick fix and rely 
on trauma as the trigger to reform. This is, however, not to argue against decisive and wholesale 
interventions. Such campaigns were historically extremely important during the sixteenth century 
Reformation, seventeenth century Puritan Revolution and later Georgian period. But we should not have 
unrealistic timescales or expectations for them. 
As we have seen, there were certain periods of British history – the 1530s, the 1640s-50s, and the 1780s-
30s -when dramatic change did occur. But rather than thinking in terms of “big bang” solutions we might 
be better off thinking of anti-corruption as an on-going process rather than a one-off cleansing event, a 
process that went in waves of activity and was directed against shifting targets. 
                                               
28 Bo Rothstein, ‘Anti-Corruption: A Big-Bang Theory’, Social Science Research Network QoG Working Paper (12009) No. 2007:3, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1338614; Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, 
Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective (Chicago, 2011) 
21 
2. Anti-Corruption was often politically motivated 
Many attacks on corruption were politically motivated, partisan, and aimed at personal, political, 
economic or religious rivals. We could point to the attacks in 1621 on the corruption of Lord Chancellor 
Bacon who was too closely associated with the faction of the duke of Buckingham; or the attack in 1695 
on the ex-leader of the early Tory party, the duke of Leeds; or the attack on Warren Hastings, the 
governor of India, in what proved to be the longest parliamentary trial in British history (lasting 8 years, 
1787-1795), who was hated by a rival East India Company faction. 
Even less partisan attacks were often fuelled by political considerations. Prosecutions were to some extent 
inevitably politicised by the use Parliament to investigate and then bring miscreants to account. A useful 
measure to use against the corrupt was that of “high crimes and misdemeanours” but this crime had to be 
prosecuted in Parliament through the process of impeachment – a type of trial that had fallen out of 
fashion in the middle ages but which was revived specifically for the 1621 corruption trial of Francis 
Bacon. Thereafter impeachment was frequently used for corruption trials - the last occurring in 1806 – 
but because of its parliamentary nature it almost invariably became politicised. Parliament also initiated 
investigations into corruption but these too were often highly partisan affairs. 
Anti-corruption was useful because it legitimated partisanship and opposition to those in authority: taking 
the moral high ground justified attacks that might, through different eyes, be seen as self-interested. Anti-
corruption could even be used to deflect accusations of corruption. In 1610, for example, Sir Stephen 
Proctor, who had a commission from the government to recover revenues lost through corrupt practices 
in return for a payment, found himself accused in Parliament of corruption, attacked by the very men 
whom he thought were corrupt. 
“Corruption” is thus often defined by those who attack what they see as abuses. Anti-corruption is thus 
never neutral – and we should always seek to identify its agenda. “Anti-corruption” was a term coined in 
the 1830s and then applied pejoratively to castigate overly self-righteous or overly-zealous reformers. 
Anti-corruption is inherently political – it challenges those in office in a language that seeks to undercut 
their legitimacy. Even if impeccably upright and legalistic in tone, such a language cannot but be political, 
because it too is engaging in a struggle over and for power. It is a way of arguing about the state – 
whether the state is too large or too small, whether its taxes are too heavy, about whether its policies are 
oppressive or whether its framework is benign. But this means that the process of reform is deeply 
political and usually deeply contested, which helps explain why reform is so challenging.   
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4. History and public dialogue 
Today Britain is ranked amongst the least corrupt countries in the world; but it has not always been so 
and the period between the sixteenth century reformation and nineteenth century reform was one during 
which many thought of Britain as highly corrupt. The Craftsman in 1726, for example, thought the state 
was rotting from the head down: “the Mystery of State-Craft abounds with such innumerable Frauds, 
Prostitutions, and Enormities in all Shapes, and under all Disguises, that it is an inexhaustible Fund, an 
eternal Resource for Satire and Reprehension; since from this grand Fountain of Corruption flow all 
those little Streams and Rivulets, which have spread themselves through every Part of this Kingdom, and 
debauched all Ranks and Orders of Men”.29 Plugging “the Fountain of Corruption” was not easy. Anti-
corruption was not a rapid, inevitable, coherent or linear process. It faced considerable obstacles, some of 
which were embedded in everyday practices, and anti-corruption was itself a value-laden and often highly 
partisan stance. Corruption was a contested and ambiguous notion that was constantly shifting in its 
nature and definition. The concepts central to the modern notion of anti-corruption - such as 
accountability, trust, and integrity in office - took at least three hundred years to evolve in Britain. 
Key to that history was the public discussion of what constituted corruption. This could take the form of 
sensationalist scandal-mongering but there was also a less eye-catching but persistent revelation of abuses, 
scrutiny of public authority, suggestions for reform (even if these were inconsistent and conflicting) and 
vigorous calls for action. Although corruption was often by its nature secretive, it was also the subject of a 
surprising amount of open debate and admonition – in newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, satirical images, 
plays, novels, mass meetings and protests. Anti-corruption had to engage the public as an issue, brought 
alive by powerful words and biting images. The intensity and quality of such discussion varied, but 
without a public dialogue there would have been no need to reflect on practices (such as the sale of 
religious pardons or secular office, trading monopolies, arbitrary fees imposed by public officers, and 
colonial extortion) that, through custom and practice, had become normalised and no need to distinguish 
between competing notions of what was corrupt and how to reform it. Britain’s own history has 
suggested that the public dialogue is as important as the measures to which it led. Sometimes reflection 
on the past was a way to critique the present; and in that sense, a historical view of corruption both 
mattered at the time and continues to do so.  
                                               
29 The Craftsman 1, 5 Dec. 1726 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Im
age 9: The fan show
s a historical take on corruption: the 1733 excise tax schem
e by Sir Robert W
alpole, 
w
idely seen as corrupt, is likened to the policies of Cardinal W
olsey, both of w
hom
 are alleged to have sold 
their country. A
nti-corruption has alw
ays thought historically. ©
 Trustees of the British M
useum
 
24 
Discussion sheet 
Was Samuel Pepys corrupt? 
Introduction 
This sheet offers a case study designed to generate 
debate and reflection amongst public officials, the 
private sector but also the general public about what 
constitutes corruption. It focuses on Samuel Pepys, the 
famous seventeenth-century diarist who recorded his 
views and behaviour in an unusually frank manner.  
Let’s start with some facts. Samuel Pepys was an administrator of the navy in the seventeenth century, 
during the reign of Charles II. His income increased six-fold during the diary years 1660-1669. Although 
his official income was £350 pa and in 1660 he had just £25 capital, by the end of 1667 he was worth 
£7000. Pepys accepted money, gifts and sexual favours from people with whom he did navy business. 
Pepys as not corrupt 
One perspective is that Pepys was a lovable rogue and brilliant administrator of the navy. In this version 
Pepys was only doing what everyone else around him did – his patron Lord Sandwich told him “that it 
was not the salary of any place that did make a man rich, but the opportunity of getting money while he is 
in the place”. It was not as though he did not have a sense of what was corrupt, since he roundly 
condemned corrupt behaviour in others. He thus recorded his shock when Richard Cooling, secretary to 
the important politician the earl of Arlington, boasted that “his horse was a bribe, and his boots a bribe 
and told us he was made up of bribes and that he makes every sort of tradesman to bribe him; and invited 
me home to his house to taste of his bribe-wine. I never heard so much vanity from a man in my life”. So 
what Pepys did was different. He did accept gifts and money but he noted that he had never asked for any 
of them; that they were done in thanks for “favours”; and that they were “presents”, “gratifications”, 
“rewards” and “acknowledgements”. He accepted gifts and presents from friends (he was very sociable) 
and for doing his job very well – he didn’t accept bribes to do any injustice but “was not so squeamish as 
not take people’s acknowledgement where I have the good fortune by may pains to do them good and 
just” service. He only ever took money for things that also benefited the king/state. Thus although Pepys 
accepted money from one contractor he noted that ‘there is not the least word or deed I have yet been 
guilty of in his behalf but what I am sure hath been to the King’s advantage and profit of the service, nor 
ever will I”. 
  
Image: John Hayls [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons 
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When he was offered a bribe to go against the public interest he contemplated returning it: “I… had a 
difference with Sir W. Batten about Mr. Bowyer’s tarr, which I am resolved to cross, though he sent me 
last night, as a bribe, a barrel of sturgeon, which, it may be, I shall send back, for I will not have the King 
abused so abominably in the price of what we buy, by Sir W. Batten’s corruption and underhand dealing”. 
So Pepys knew what corruption was and condemned it in other administrators throughout his life. But 
unless he accrued money when he was in office he was likely to have a miserable old age because there 
was no state pension or welfare system. He was actually quite self-restrained in the wealth he gained –he 
could, had he been really rapacious, have got a lot more, since there were so few checks on his actions. In 
any case, Pepys worked so hard for the state that he ruined his eyesight and had to leave off writing his 
diary. 
 
Pepys as corrupt 
A very different take on Pepys would see him as an avaricious man who forced himself on – some might 
say raped – at least one woman who sought his favour on behalf of her husband and extracted money 
from ordinary sailors as well as rich government contractors. What he called “acknowledgements” and 
“presents” were really bribes, and he deluded himself by trying to call them by less pejorative terms. He 
was evidently ashamed of his conduct: on one occasion he opened a packet containing money with his 
eyes shut “not looking into it till all the money was out, that I might say I saw no money in the paper if 
ever I should be Questioned about it”. Pepys lacked integrity in his personal and professional life, and 
was vain, showing off the silver flagons or the “very pretty Mare” that he had received as bribes. Others 
certainly saw his actions as corrupt, as a 1679 pamphlet indicates. This raised a printed “hue and cry” after 
him, the metaphorical communal chase after a common criminal, for having extorted an array of exotic 
gifts. Pepys and his crony Will Hewer were accused of taking lavish gifts and money that ought to be 
returned to the seamen from whom they had extorted them. 
Pepys only evaded official enquiries into his conduct because he lied to them or hid the true picture: in 
1668 Pepys decided to “prepare” those summoned to be interrogated by commissioners of account 
“about what presents I had from them, that they may not publish them”. Pepys and his colleagues were 
accused of having “corruptly preferred and postponed payments” and although he resolved “to declare 
plainly, and, once for all, the truth of the whole, and what my profit hath been”, in the end he found he 
could evade making the revelation. In the winter of 1669-70 Pepys was again called to account and 
responded by protesting that he never did “directly or indirectly …demand or express any expectation of 
fee, gratuity or reward from any person for any service” but deliberately underestimated the amount he 
was now worth by £6000 in order to make him seem more innocent. 
So was Pepys corrupt? 
Pepys seems to have been caught between different conceptions of corruption and probity, with 
accusations of corruption becoming highly politicised and polemical in character, in large part because so 
many of the practices were deeply embedded in the wider social and cultural practices of the time, such as 
friendship, patronage, clientelism, and customs of respect and deference. Does this excuse his behaviour? 



